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LONGSHOREMEN'S PERSONAL INJURY
ACTIONS UNDER THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
TO THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
JAMES M. HAZEN*
JOHN M. TORIELLO**
Much like ancient mariners who puzzled over the Greek god
Triton and the mermaids, modern judges and legislators often
have been vexed in their attempt to ascertain a proper legal classi-
fication for the longshoreman. Bound at once to the seafaring trade
and mainland commerce, the harbor worker frequently found him-
self in the anomalous position of being land-based but regarded,
nevertheless, as a seaman in the eyes of the law. One of the most
confusing instances of this phenomenon was the litigation spawned
by work-related personal injuries.
In an effort to bring order out of chaos, Congress amended the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) in 1972 to clarify and limit the circumstances under
which the employee of a stevedore could recover damages from a
shipowner for on-the-job accidents.'
INTRODUCTION
The United States federal courts have developed a substantial
and, for the most part, unanimous jurisprudence concerning long-
shoremen's2 personal injury cases under the 1972 amendments to
* A.B., Columbia College, 1970; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1973. Mr.
Hazen is currently associated with the New York City firm of Haight, Gardner, Poor &
Havens.
** B.A., Brooklyn College, 1974; J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 1977. Mr.
Toriello is currently associated with the New York City firm of Haight, Gardner, Poor &
Havens.
Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 838 (2d Cir. 1977).
2 As used in this Article, the term "longshoreman" refers to a "person engaged in mari-
time employment, including any... person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
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the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) . As with all attempts to formulate and apply general
principles to specific facts, however, there have been some decisions
which either overlook important policy considerations or unneces-
sarily complicate the process which determines the existence or
nonexistence of liability. This Article will examine the decisions of
the various federal courts of appeals, with an eye toward the con-
siderations which led to the 1972 amendments in an effort to
identify a standard for determining liability which comports with
Congress' intent in enacting the amendments.
PRE-AMENDMENT LAW
Following the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927,1 the steve-
dore's 5 liability for an employee's work-related injuries was limited
to the compensation provided for by the Act.' The longshoreman's
remedies against third parties responsible for his injury, however,
were preserved.7 Thus, a longshoreman could receive compensation
harborworker, including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)
(1976).
Pub. L. No. 92-576, §§ 2-22, 86 Stat. 1251 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
Pub. L. No. 803, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
As used in this Article, the term "stevedore" refers to the independent contractor which
is responsible for the work performed by the longshoreman.
5 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended 1972) provided in part: "The liability of an employer
prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee . . . . " See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
276 F.2d 42, 47 (5th Cir. 1960); Doll v. Scott Paper Co., 91 F.2d 860, 862 (3d Cir. 1937);
Samuels v. Munson S.S. Line, Inc., 63 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1933); Moore v. Christiensen
S.S. Co., 53 F.2d 299, 299 (5th Cir. 1931); 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURIES § 63 (3d ed. 1975). The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) followed two unsuccessful attempts by Congress to apply state workmen's com-
pensation laws to longshoremen. See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). For an account of the historical
development of the LHWCA, see 1 M. NORRIs, supra, §§ 56-57.
7 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) (amended 1972). The original act provided for an automatic
assignment of the longshoreman's cause of action against a third party whenever compensa-
tion was accepted by the longshoreman. Pub. L. No. 803, § 18, 44 Stat. 1429 (1927). This
assignment was modified in 1938 by making it contingent upon the acceptance of compensa-
tion under an award in a compensation order filed by the Deputy Commissioner. Despite the
explicit statutory language, the courts effectively nullified this assignment by finding a
"conflict of interests" exception. See, e.g., Czaplicki v. The S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S.
525, 531 (1956); Johnson v. Sword Line, 257 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1958).
Finally in 1959, without any reference to the "conflict of interests" decisions, the Con-
gress amended the Act to permit the simultaneous acceptance of compensation under an
award and the prosecution of a lawsuit so long as the lawsuit was commenced within six
months of the award. Following the abolition of the Ryan indemnity action by the 1972
amendments, this assignment provision has been given real meaning by the courts and the
conflict of interests exception has once again been relegated to the status of "exception"
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from his employer and recover damages if successful in an action
against the shipowner. In order to prevent a double recovery in such
a situation, the courts imposed a lien in favor of the stevedore on
the longshoreman's tort recovery up to the amount of the compensa-
tion payments.'
Few problems in this scheme of compensation were encoun-
tered until 1946, when, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,9 the Su-
rather than "rule". Rodriquez v. Compass Shipping Co., 456 F. Supp. 1014, 1021 & n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); see Bandy v. Bank Line Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Va. 1977). See also
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1977).
The shipowner's liability "for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unsea-
worthiness of the ship," The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), is an extension of the warranty
which originally inured only to the benefit of cargo owners. This warranty of seaworthiness
was extended to seamen due to the special hazards of their work on seagoing voyages and
the draconian discipline imposed upon them. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMirALTY,
150-55, 452 (2d ed. 1975); see Manich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1944).
Longshoremen were not considered within this protected category, however, since they did
not do the work of seamen. G. GiLMORE & C. BLACK, supra, at 438-40. As a result, they were
limited to an action in negligence against the shipowner. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175
(1903).
In 1926, the Supreme Court brought longshoremen within the protection of the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), by holding that land-based harbor workers were seamen. International
Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). The Haverty Court based its decision upon
a fiction propounded in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914), where the
Court noted that "[formerly [loading and unloading cargo] was done by the ship's crew;
but owing to the exigencies of increasing commerce and the demand for rapidity and special
skill, it has become a specialized service devolving upon a class 'as clearly identified with
maritime affairs as are the mariners.' "Id. at 62. Land-based harbor workers, however, plied
their trade for centuries before the Haverty Court accorded them seaman's status. See Te-
treault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381
(1954). Congress shortly overruled Haverty by enacting the LHWCA in 1927, Pub. L. No. 803,
44 Stat. 1424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § § 901-950 (1976)), thereby providing workmen's compen-
sation to the longshoremen and eliminating their fictional Jones Act status. Under § 933 of
the Act, however, the injured longshoreman retained the right to bring a negligence action
against the shipowner, predicated upon a duty to use reasonable care in providing a safe place
to work. Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 418, 418-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 976 (1953); Anderson v. Lorentzen, 160 F.2d 173, 173-75 (2d Cir. 1947); GriUo v.
Royal Norwegian Gov't, 139 F.2d 237, 238 (2d Cir. 1943).
There is no express grant of a lien in the LHWCA. In The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir.
1943), a stevedore-employer was allowed to recoup the compensation payments made to the
longshoreman following the latter's successful third-party suit. That the LHWCA did not
provide the longshoreman with a right to compensation from both employer and shipowner
was "an implicit recognition that the employer has a right to reimbursement for his outlay
under the Compensation Act out of his employee's adequate recovery from a third person."
Id. at 40; see Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
886 (1953); 1 M. Nomus, supra note 6, § 100, at 181-83; Noe, Stevedore Remedies Under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 280, 280 n.5
(1975).
1 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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preme Court held that a longshoreman is engaged in traditional
seaman's work and is therefore entitled to the benefit of the ship-
owner's warranty of seaworthiness. 0 Because of the absolute na-
ture of this newly imposed liability for longshoremen's injuries,
shipowners attempted to shift at least some of the burden by
seeking contribution from the stevedore in cases of concurrent neg-
ligence.1 The Supreme Court thwarted this attempt, however, by
establishing a broad no-contribution rule. 2 Notwithstanding this
setback, shipowners continued their attempts to shift the burden
of liability by seeking complete indemnity from the stevedore
whenever the employee's injuries were caused by a breach of the
stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance. Reasoning that
10 Id. at 95. Sieracki, an employee of an independent stevedoring firm under contract to
load the plaintiff's ship, was injured by defective equipment being used on board. Id. at 87.
The Court reasoned that "liability arises as an incident, not merely of the seaman's contract,
but of performing the ship's service with the owner's consent." Id. at 97. While working on
board the ship, the longshoreman was considered to be "a seaman. . . doing a seaman's work
and incurring a seaman's hazards." Id. at 99. Accordingly, the Sieracki Court recognized that
liability for a longshoreman's injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of a ship is essentially
"a species of liability without fault," the imposition of which in this case was based, at least
in part, on the stevedore's supposed inability to discover and remove perilous conditions
aboard the ship. Id. at 94-95.
Generally stated, the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness "contemplates that a ship's
hull, gear, appliances, ways, appurtenances and manning will be reasonably fit for its in-
tended purpose." 2 M. Nomus, supra note 6, § 298; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, at
150-55. Seaworthiness is an absolute and non-delegable duty of the shipowner; originally
contractual in nature, it arises out of the relationship between shipowner and crew. 2 M.
NoRRs, supra note 6, § § 299, 303. See generally id. § § 298-323.
11 See, e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950),
wherein a longshoreman was injured by a defective guy rope, negligently supplied by the
shipowner and used by the stevedore. Id. at 323. Refusing to allow the shipowner any right
of contribution against the stevedore, the second circuit ruled that the stevedore was under
no duty to discover the defects, since the LHWCA created absolute stevedore-longshoreman
liability. Id. at 325; see Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1951).
In United States v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950), a
longshoreman was injured by a defective winch which was negligently supplied by the ship-
owner. Id. at 182. The court found that the stevedore's negligence in using the winch after
notice that it might be defective entitled the shipowner to full indemnity. Id. at 183.
12 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). In
Halcyon, an employee of Haenn was injured while working aboard a moored ship owned by
Halcyon. Id. at 283. The employee sued Halcyon on theories of negligence and unseaworthi-
ness, and Halcyon impleaded Haenn as a third-party defendant, alleging that Haenn was
negligent. Although a jury found Halcyon 25% negligent and Haenn 75% negligent, the
district court ruled that Haenn was liable in contribution for 50% of the damages. Id. at 283.
This ruling apparently was based on the admiralty doctrine used in collision cases, whereby
joint wrongdoers share the burden of damages equally. Id. at 284. Reversing the lower court's
determination; the Supreme Court refused to extend the doctrine of loss-sharing to non-
collision cases, concluding that such a solution should await congressional action. Id. at 285.
Furthermore, it expressed doubt as to whether any such rule should be based on equal division
of damages or relative degrees of fault and whether the LHWCA should limit the operation
of a contribution rule. Id. at 286-87.
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this warranty is the "essence" of the stevedoring contract, the
Court upheld this approach in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic S.S. Corp.'3 The Ryan Court observed that unlike a ship-
owner's claim for contribution, the indemnity action was not barred
by the exclusive liability section of the LHWCA, since such an
action was predicated solely upon a duty running directly from the
stevedore to the shipowner."
Thus, while the burden of liability ultimately was borne by the
party whose default caused the injury, a pattern of circular litiga-
tion was established as the norm in longshoremen's personal injury
actions. An injured longshoreman could receive compensation from
his employer and sue the shipowner for negligence and breach of the
warranty of seaworthiness. " The shipowner, in turn, could obtain
indemnity from the longshoreman's employer based on a breach of
the warranty of workmanlike performance whenever the stevedore
failed to provide reasonably safe equipment or conduct the stevedor-
ing operations in a reasonably safe manner." Thus, the courts were
besieged with longshoremen's personal injury suits and the steve-
" 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
" Id. at 131-32. The stevedore's agreement to provide stevedoring services was construed
to be a "contractual undertaking to stow the cargo 'with reasonable safety' and thus to save
the shipowner harmless from [the stevedore's] failure to do so." Id. at 130. Since the plain-
tiff's action was not based upon a joint tortfeasor theory, the Halcyon bar to contribution was
inapplicable. Id. at 133.
Although the Ryan indemnity action was challenged as arising only from the employee's
injury and, as such, in "hopeless contradiction" with Halcyon, see G. GmUoRE & C. BLACK,
supra note 7, at 443; Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity For Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite'
Industrial Accident Litigation, N.Y.L.F. 587, 592 (1974), the permissibility of that theory of
shipowner recovery remained law until the enactment of the 1972 amendments. See, e.g.,
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960); Weyerhaeuser S.S.
Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); Rich v. United States, 177 F.2d 688 (2d
Cir. 1949).
11 33 U.S.C. § 933(a)(1976); see Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Gutierrez
v. Waterman S.S. Co., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962);
Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396
(1954), aff'g per curiam Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953); Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
See generally George, Ship's Liability to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness-Sieracki
Through Usner, 3 J. MAR. L. & Com. 45 (1970); Shields & Byrne, Application of the
"Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 1137 (1963).
1" Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Ryan Stevedoring Co.
v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The stevedore could successfully defend
against a shipowner's indemnity suit only where it was able to demonstrate that the ship-
owner's conduct prevented or seriously handicapped the stevedore in the performance of its
service. See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 567 (1958);
Hurdich v. Eastmount Shipping Corp., 503 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Stover,
Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle of Liability, 61 MicH. L. Ra,. 539 (1963).
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dore often would be held liable for the total amount of damages. In
short, the LHWCA was a failure as a workmen's compensation stat-
ute."
Various reasons have been offered for the peculiar and at times
tortured development of the law regarding longshoremen's personal
injury suits."8 It appears clear, however, that once the Supreme
Court adopted the position that no-fault liability for injuries to
longshoremen should rest with the shipowner under the warranty of
seaworthiness rather than the stevedore-employer under the
LHWCA,'" a further adjustment was necessary because such judi-
cially imposed no-fault liability did not offer the compensating fac-
tors which a legislatively established workmen's compensation sys-
'1 The predominant criticism of such circuitous litigation centered upon the nullifying
effect it had on the LHWCA. In enacting the LHWCA, Congress attempted to place the
burden of compensation on the stevedore in all cases and the risk of injury on the shipowner
only when the shipowner's negligence caused the injury. The Court's decisions shifted the risk
in virtually all cases to the stevedore by means of the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance. See Stover, supra note 16, at 563; Note, The Injured Longshoreman vs. The
Shipowner After 1972: Business Invitees, Land-Based Standards, and Assumption of Risk,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 776 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Longshoreman After 1972]. Other
critics of the Ryan-Sieracki line of cases have said that in addition to nullifying the Act, the
result was inefficient, unfair, confusing, and caused needless litigation. See Strachan Ship-
ping Co. v. Melvin, 327 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., dissenting); Proudfoot, "The
Tar Baby": Maritime Personal Injury Indemnity Actions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 423, 445 (1968);
Shields & Byrne, supra note 15, at 1151-52; Comment, The Stevedore's Duty to Indemnify
Shipowners for Injuries to Longshoremen-Employers, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 530, 530, 565-66
(1964); Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927:
Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1553, 1569
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Half-Way Protection].
,1 Some commentators have attributed the problems to fundamental deficiencies in the
LHWCA which have been distorted by judicial interpretation. Proudfoot, supra note 17, at
445. Others have cited Congress' inaition, see, e.g., Comment, Negligence Standards Under
the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Ex-
amining the Viewpoints, 21 VILL. L. REv. 244, 252 (1975-1976), while one commentator has
argued that the problems arose due to the improvident use of contract theory in dealing with
what is essentially a tort problem. Proudfoot, supra note 17, at 445. Other explanations have
ranged from the longshoreman's incentive to sue because of high damage awards, Half-Way
Protection, supra note 17, at 1571, to the use of the indemnity theory to alleviate the financial
stress of the shipping industry, id., and the desire to fasten tort liability on third parties
connected with a work accident, Theis, Amended Section Five of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 41 TENN. L. REv. 773, 773 (1974).
" The correlation of the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance and the
shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness is useful in reciting the historical development of
third-party liability under the LHWCA. The authors do not intend to suggest, however, that
the existence of the warranty of workmanlike performance is necessarily dependent upon the
finding of an absolute nondelegable duty on the shipowner or other general contractor. See
2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 76.43(a), at 14-357 (1972).
19781 1972 AMENDMENTS TO LHWCA
tem offered. Although the costs ultimately borne by the stevedore
far exceeded what Congress envisioned when the LHWCA was
originally enacted, the placement of the burden on the defaulting
party gave stevedores and shipowners alike an incentive to adopt
procedures which would increase safety within the industry.
THE 1972 AMENDMENTS AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress specifically repudiated the application of a no-fault
standard of recovery against any party except the stevedore-
employer when it enacted the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA.20
Accordingly, a shipowner is no longer strictly liable to longshoremen
for injuries caused by a breach of the non-delegable duties to pro-
vide a seaworthy ship or a safe place to work, since such duties have
been abolished. 21
Section 905(b), as amended in 1972, provides in part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person. . . may bring an action against such vessel
as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and
the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly
and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was
employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be
permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
stevedoring services to the vessel. . . . The liability of the vessel under this subsec-
tion shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at
the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be
exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under
this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
21 As amended, § 905(b) expressly provides that a third-party action against the vessel
may not be predicated on a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(1976). Thus, if the longshoreman now wishes to sue the vessel, he must base the suit on
negligence.
The Ryan indemnity action also has been explicitly eliminated by the provision that "the
employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly." Id. The
longshoreman's absolute right to compensation from the stevedore-employer remains intact.
33 U.S.C. § 904 (1976). As stated in the House committee report:
The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a vessel
in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment
ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage action is concerned, and not to
endow him with any special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under
whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as 'unseaworthiness',
'nondelegable duty', or the like.
Persons to whom compensation is payable under the Act retain the right to
recover damages for negligence against the vessel, but under these amendments
they cannot bring a damage action under the judicially enacted doctrine of unsea-
worthiness. Thus a vessel shall not be liable in damages for acts or omissions of
stevedores or employees of stevedores subject to this Act.
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Both the Senate and House committee reports demonstrate
that the overriding concern in enacting the 1972 amendments was
the fashioning of an effective workmen's compensation scheme
which would not only provide injured workers with adequate com-
pensation, but would also give employers a strengthened incentive
to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety.22 Additionally,
the legislation was intended to diminish substantially the number
of third-party actions and thereby provide resources to help finance
the generous compensation benefits under the LHWCA.23 Partly
because of these increased compensation benefits, both committees
concluded that the imposition of liability without fault on third-
party vessels was unnecessary. 4 In addition, the Sieracki view that
longshoremen are engaged in seamen's work and subject to seamen's
risks was emphatically rejected. 25 Similarly, the rationale under-
lying the Ryan indemnity action was found to be inapposite since
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4703.
11 See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4699. The House committee
recognized that longshoring was "one of the most hazardous types of occupations," H.R. REP.
No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4705, and
expressed concern for the improvement of safety conditions:
It is important to note that adequate workmen's compensation benefits are not
only essential to meeting the needs of the injured employee and his family, but, by
assuring that the employer bears the cost of unsafe conditions, serve to strengthen
the employer's incentive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety.
Id. at 4699. The Senate Report reaffirms this intent by emphasizing: "It is the Committee's
view that every appropriate means be applied toward. . . a workmen's compensation system
which maximizes industry's motivation to bring about such an improvement." S. REP. No.
1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
= The Senate committee report states:
The committee heard testimony that the number of third party actions brought
under the Sieracki and Ryan line of decisions had increased substantially in recent
years and that much of the financial resources which could better be utilized to pay
improved compensation benefits were now being spent to defray litigation costs.
S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972). The amendments to the LHWCA also provided
for an increase in the maximum weekly compensation of longshoremen from a fixed dollar
amount to a percentage of the "national average weekly wage" for the injured worker's
occupation. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1976). Thus, benefits rose from $70 per week to 2/3 of the
claimant's average weekly wage, up to $350.
2, See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4703-04.
2 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4703-04. The House Committee realized that the rationale for applying the seawor-
thiness doctrine to seamen did not justify its application to longshoremen. Non-seamen
working on a vessel in port are not subject to "the extreme hazards incident to" the employ-
ment of seamen, "which frequently requires long sea voyages and duties of obedience to orders
not generally required of other workers." Id.
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"the vessel [would] no longer be liable under the seaworthiness
doctrine for injuries which [were] really the fault of the steve-
dore.""8
The committees emphasized, however, that an action could
still be maintained. against the vessel, although the predicate for
such an action could not be the stevedore's or any other party's
negligence.Y Express language in the statute and the legislative
history establish that the stevedore would bear the major responsi-
bility for the proper and safe conduct of cargo operations, and its
negligence would not provide a basis for shipowner liability.8 In
those cases where neither party was at fault, the stevedore alone
21 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4704. Since the injured longshoreman can only recover from the vessel if the
shipowner is negligent, there would be no need to permit the vessel to seek indemnification
from the stevedore. The amendment not only prohibited the "implied" indemnity agreement,
but also any express agreement since it recognized that shipowners could, by their superior
economic strength, require express indemnification provisions. Such a result would be in
contravention of the amendment and against public policy. Id.
2 Id. In explaining the 1972 Amendments to his colleagues on the House floor, Represent-
ative Eckhardt concluded:
Now, if this bill is passed, you wipe out these decisions of a quarter of a century.
You wipe out the non-delegable duty of the ship to protect the worker, and you
permit the ship to simply leave the entire job to the stevedoring company . ...
118 CONG. REC. 3683 (1972).
The House committee commented on the express language of905(b) that "no such action
shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
stevedoring services to the vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). Congress iterated its intention
that the shipowner not be held liable "for the manner or method in which stevedores or
employees of stevedores. . perform their work. . .; for gear or equipment of stevedores or
employees of stevedore . . . whether used aboard ship, or shore. . . or for other categories
of unseaworthiness which have been judicially established." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4703-04. Furthermore, the
House committee report emphasized that the vessel would be held to a standard of care
equivalent to land-based standards, rather than a maritime standard of care based on the
absolute duty of seaworthiness. Id.; see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
n 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4703-04. The LHWCA of 1927 was amended in 1958
"to authorize the establishment of an effective safety program." H.R. REP. No. 2287, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3843. As amended, 33
U.S.C. § 941(a) (1976) provides in part:
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employmient and places of employ-
ment which shall be reasonably safe for his employees in all employments covered
by this chapter and shall install, furnish, maintain, and use such devices and
safeguards with particular reference to equipment used by and working conditions
established by such employers as the Secretary may determine by regulation or
order to be reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of such
employees, and to render safe such employment and places of employment, and to
prevent injuries to his employees.
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would bear the burden of liability by providing compensation bene-
fits and medical care.
With respect to the negligence remedy preserved for longshore-
men, the reports and the statute state that this remedy should be
governed by land-based theories of liability.9 Thus, while a long-
shoreman would enjoy the same rights against third parties as a
non-maritime worker, the shipowner would enjoy the same protec-
tions as its land-based counterpart."0 Nonetheless, the committees
also specified that this negligence remedy would be a matter of
federal law and should therefore be nationally uniform.3'
Out of this legislative history five principles evolve. First, the
most important consideration is the improvement of safety condi-
tions in the longshorring industry. Second, this compensation
scheme can, if properly applied, serve as an effective means to
fulfill the congressional goal of increased safety. Third, the only
party subject to liability regardless of fault is the stevedore-
employer. Fourth, the primary responsibility for providing safe
working conditions rests with the stevedore-employer. Fifth, the
vessel or other third party must exercise reasonable care, just as a
land-based person must in providing a safe place to work.' 2
21 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) provides that "[tihe liability of the vessel ... shall not be
based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occured."
Additionally, the House report states that it was Congress' intent "not to endow [the long-
shoreman] with any special maritime theory of liability . . . such as 'unseaworthiness.'"
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4703.
3 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong. 2d Seass. 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4703.
11 The Senate committee report states:
[Tihe Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy authorized in the
bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the State
in which the port may be located. The committee intends that legal questions which
may arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be determined
as a matter of Federal law.
S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972).
3 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the governmental
agency charged with enf6rcing the Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring promul-
gated under 33 U.S.C. § 941(a', recently commissioned a study of the causes of accidents
arising out of stevedoring operations. See COOPER & Co., A CAUSAL STUDY OF ACCIDENTS IN
THE LONGSHORING INDUSTRY AND OSHA's EFFECTIVENESS (1975). The study made the following
findings:
The industry itself has a number of unique and special problems which vir-
tually make OSHA's tasks almost insurmountable. The industry's difficulties and
special characteristics are not often quoted: 'special material handling gear, casual
labor and highly hazardous and changing workplace.' The special problem in this
industry are its well documented inordinantly poor industrial relations complicat-
ing effective supervision of work, a long inbred tradition of doing things unsafely
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDMENTS
In accordance with the clear congressional intent to eliminate
longshoreman's actions based on unseaworthiness, each court of
appeals which has confronted the issue has clearly stated that third-
party actions brought by persons covered under the LHWCA can no
longer be predicated on any species of the non-delegable duty to
provide a safe place to work.3 3 The more difficult task devolving
upon the courts since 1972, however, has involved determination of
the respective duties of the shipowner and the stevedore. Clearly,
where a duty is improperly ascribed to the shipowner, not only is
liability unfairly imposed but, more importantly, the compensation
scheme no longer serves to prod the employer to adopt and enforce
precautions which would avoid future accidents of a similar type.
Accordingly, this delineation must be accomplished with proper
regard for the congressional finding that the primary responsibility
for providing a safe place to work is on the stevedore-employer and
the congressional desire to utilize the compensation scheme as an
effective incentive to improve the safety conditions in the longshor-
ing industry. 5
In view of the congressional direction to develop a law of negli-
gence which is at once lanjd-based and nationally uniform, the
courts have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Second
Restatement) for guidelines and principles. Indeed, several courts
and accepting it, a serious problem of alcoholism and a number of economic incen-
tive factors which mitigate against improvement and safety.
Ultimately the longshoring industry's problems will only be solved when the
industry, its unions and even OSHA stop projecting the blame for safety problems
on the other parties and begin to seriously cooperate in hazard reduction.
The most likely area for such increased cooperation is in improving the quality
of attitudes and skills of first line supervisors as a means of reducing the prolifera-
tion of unsafe procedures contributing to accidents.
Id. at 1-3. Supported by extensive research, these conclusions dramatically demonstrate the
wisdom of the express provision in the statute that the longshoreman cannot recover against
the shipowner for injuries caused by the stevedore's negligence.
n See, e.g., Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Wescott v. Impresas Armadoras, S.A., Panama, 564 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir. 1977); Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861
(1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977); Bess v. Agromar
Line, 518 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1975).
11 A stevedore has no incentive to remedy a defect or improve safety conditions unless it
either profits directly or is saved the expense of paying damages in the event of injury. See,
e.g., The Longshoreman After 1972, supra note 17.
2 See note 28 supra.
3 The most frequently cited sections of the Second Restatement are 343 and 343A.
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Section 343 states that a possessor of land is liable for injuries incurred by his invitees due to
a condition on his land if he:
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition,
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees,
and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail
to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 343 (1965). Section 343A states:
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known
or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land,
or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the
harm should be anticipated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965).
As one commentator has noted: "These sections impose a duty of reasonable care on a
possessor of land if he has or should have knowledge of the danger. But the duty of care is
removed if the land possessor can expect that his invitees will notice the danger." The
Longshoreman After 1972, supra note 17, at 779; see, e.g., Wiles v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc.,
574 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1489 (1978); Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977);
Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panana 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977).
In addition to § § 343 and 343A, various courts have relied upon those provisions of the
Second Restatement which concern liability for the acts of independent contractors. Sections
409 to 414 of the Second Restatement provide:
§ 409. Except as stated in § § 410-429 the employer of an independent contractor is
not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contrac-
tor or his servants.
§ 410. The employer of an independent contractor is subject to the same liability
for physical harm caused by an act or omission committed by the contractor pur-
suant to orders or directions negligently given by the employer, as though the act
or omission were that of the employer himself.
§ 411. An employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons caused
by his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful con-
tractor
(a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and
carefully done, or
(b) to perform any duty which the employer owes to third persons.
§ 412. One who is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain land or
chattels in such condition as not to involve unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
others and who entrusts the work of repair and maintenance to an independent
contractor, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to
exercise such care as the circumstances may reasonably require him to exercise to
ascertain whether the land or chattel is in reasonably safe condition after the
contractor's work is completed.
§ 413. One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer
should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk
of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the
employer
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have adopted the Second Restatement as the appropriate standard
by which to judge the shipowner's liability. 37 It should be empha-
sized, however, that the congressional reference to land-based law
was intended primarily to prevent the expansion of the vessel's lia-
bility to an extent which might approximate the no-fault standards
of the seaworthiness warranty."8 Accordingly, land-based principles,
as evidenced by the Second Restatement, should only be adopted
when they comport with the congressional finding that the primary
duty for providing a safe place to work rests with the stevedore-
employer. 9 The ensuing examination of the various federal courts
of appeals' decisions reveals that, with some notable exceptions, the
general approach has been to analyze the propriety of liability in
each case with primary emphasis on this congressional intent.
In Bess v. Agromar Line,40 the plaintiff was injured aboard the
defendant's vessel while participating in the loading operation con-
ducted by his employer.4 Noting the express abolition of the unsea-
worthiness remedy in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, the
Bess court concluded that the amendments "preclude an action
based upon the non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work
or a breach thereof."42 The lower court's dismissal of the case was
affirmed, because the unsafe condition which caused the injury was
"the result of the loading process which was under the sole control
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions,
or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking
of such precautions.
§ 414. One who entrusts work to an independent contractor but who retains the
control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others
for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 409-414 (1965); see, e.g., Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co.,
554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563
F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1977).
" See, e.g., Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757, 759 (4th Cir.
1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc.,
394 F. Supp. 1092, 1097-98 (D. Md. 1975); Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644,
646 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See generally The Longshoreman After 1972, supra note 17.
11 Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffarhts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 767-68 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (3-
judge court); see note 27 supra.
11 See id.
" 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 739. The plaintiff in Bess was injured when he stepped into a space between bales
which had been previously stowed by his longshore gang. Id. at 740. The plaintiff had alleg-
edly requested dunnage from his supervisor so that the tiers of cargo could cover over a flat
work surface provided. Id. at 739.
4" Id. at 741-42.
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of the independent stevedoring contractor."43
While the fourth circuit in Bess refused to rest liability on the
doctrine of seaworthiness, language in the court's opinion did sug-
gest that, had the defendant-shipowner known of the unsafe con-
dition, a different determination might have resulted." Later deci-
n Id. at 742. The fourth circuit has dealt with the issue of the shipowner's liability in
several cases decided subsequent to Bess. In Butler v. O/Y Finnlines Ltd., 537 F.2d 1205 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976), the court recognized that when the vessel's personnel
interfered with the cargo operations and asserted direct control over the method utilized by
the stevedore, the shipowner was under a duty to avoid acting in a negligent manner. In
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977), modified on
other grounds on rehearing en banc, 577 F.2d 1153, cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3310 (Nov. 7,"
1978), the court, inter alia, affirmed the district court's grant of a new trial based on a charge
which could have been construed as imposing a non-delegable duty on the shipowner to
ensure that cargo was loaded properly by an outport stevedore. 558 F.2d at 190. In Edmonds,
the plaintiff was injured in the course of discharging operations when he stepped behind a
container which then rolled backwards. The plaintiff alleged that his injury was caused by
the loading stevedore's failure to set the container's air brakes. Id. at 189-90. The court
reasoned:
The stowage of the cargo at Rotterdam was under the exclusive control of the
Dutch stevedore. There was no evidence of knowledge on the part of the defendant
of any dangerous condition, nor that, in the exercise of ordinary care, such knowl-
edge should have been acquired.
Id. at 190. Since the instruction that the shipowner had a duty to see "that the cargo is
properly stowed," id. n.4, could have been construed as imposing a non-delegable duty to
provide a safe place to work, the court found that the district judge had not abused his
discretion in setting aside the first verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 190.
In Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978), the fourth circuit affirmed
a jury verdict for the defendant shipowner. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the jury
charge was erroneous because the trial judge failed to instruct that the shipowner had a duty
to provide a reasonably safe place to work or that the jury should evaluate the conduct of
the shipowner in light of the Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring. In addition, the
plaintiff claimed that the trial judge should have, but did not, apply the standards enun-
ciated in §§ 343A, 413 and 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, at 1076-79.
As to the first objection, the fourth circuit found that the jury was properly instructed
that the shipowner had a duty to exercise ordinary care to provide persons working aboard
with a reasonably safe place to work. The court specifically found that the charge espoused
by the plaintiff would contravene the congressional intent underlying the 1972 amend-
ments. Id. at 1077. So too, the plaintiff's contention regarding § 343A of the Second Re-
statement was disposed with because such a charge would conflict with the congressional
intent underlying the amendments when the condition was created by the longshoring opera-
tion which was under the control of the stevedore. Repeating the Riddle court's analysis of §
343A, the court in Chavis found that this Restatement section is inapposite to any case under
the LHWCA whenever the "stevedore or shipyard would be expected to correct the condition
in the course of discharging its responsibility for the safety of the longshoreman or shipyard
worker." Id. at 1080 (quoting Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1107 (4th Cir.
1977)). Sections 413 and 416 of the Second Restatement were also found inapplicable under
the LHWCA because they represent a standard of vicarious liability which is not available
to the employee of the independent contractor. 576 F.2d at 1081.
" 518 F.2d at 742 & n.9.
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sions by the fourth circuit served to buttress this inference,45 but it
was not until the court's decision in Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mari-
ners Corp., Panama," that the question was squarely presented. In
Anuszewski, two longshoremen were injured when a hatch cover
support beam fell into the hold in which they were working. 7
Knowledge of this condition was presumed on the part of the ship-
owner because a crew member was present during the stevedoring
operations to prevent pilferage. 8 Nonetheless, the fourth circuit af-
firmed the district court's use and interpretation of section 343 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that it was reasonable
for the shipowner to have expected that the longshoremen would
discover the unsafe condition and protect themselves by correcting
it. Observing that the condition was open and obvious and not one
which the longshoremen "invitees" were required to face despite
knowledge, the court found that these longshoremen had been in-
jured by the negligence of the stevedore who had control of the
premises and not by any actionable negligence on the part of the
shipowner."
Thereafter, in Riddle v. Exxon Transportation Co.,"° the court
analyzed the shipowner's liability in light of section 409 of the
Second Restatement, which absolves employers from liability for
acts or omissions of independent contractors.' Although the Second
" See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 558 F.2d 186, 189 (4th
Cir. 1977), modified on other grounds on rehearing en banc, 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3310 (Nov. 7, 1978).
46 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977).
41 540 F.2d at 758. Although the presence of the beam was an unsafe condition which
previously had been complained of to the stevedoring foreman, the situation had not been
remedied by the day of the accident. Id.
8 391 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Md. 1975), affl'd, 540 F.2d 759 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1098 (1977).
" 391 F. Supp. at 1148.
563 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1113. Section 409 of the Second Restatement provides that "[ejxcept as stated
in §§ 410-429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965). Plaintiff Riddle was injured in an explosion aboard the
defendant's vessel, which was being repaired by the plaintiff's employer. 563 F.2d at 1106-
07. Discussing the First Restatement, the court found that under the traditional rule a
shipowner did not owe a duty to warn the employees of independent contractors of dangerous
conditions which are open and obvious. Id. at 1110-11. In light of sections 343 and 343A of
the Second Restatement, however, the court noted that there has been some movement away
from the traditional rule and observed that there was authority for the proposition that a
shipowner might be liable for injuries resulting from open and obvious dangers when he
should have realized that the plaintiff would not be protected despite his knowledge or the
obviousness of the condition. 563 F.2d at 1111. The court concluded, however, that the
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Restatement provides twenty exceptions to this rule,52 the court
summarily found that the great bulk of these exceptions were in-
applicable to third-party actions under the LHWCA since they are
based on a theory approximating non-delegable duty. The court also
rejected the contention that the retention of a right to inspect the
stevedore's work would be sufficient to impose a duty upon the
shipowner to closely supervise the stevedore's work and ensure the
safety of the longshoremen.53 Accordingly, the court concluded that
"where the dangerous condition resulting in injuries to a longshore-
man or ship repair worker was due to the negligence of the stevedore
or shipyard, without the knowledge or participation of the ship-
owner, the latter [is] not liable." 54
The Riddle court relied heavily on an earlier decision by the
third circuit in Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co.15 In a comprehensive
discussion, the Hurst court reviewed the applicability of sections
343-343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the context of the
longshoreman's negligence remedy against the shipowner. The court
held that sections 343 and 343A could not be relied on since their
application would "create a duty in the shipowner to apprise him-
self of, to warn the longshoremen of and to protect them from dan-
gerous features of the independent contractor's-i.e. the steve-
dore's-activity."6 Such a duty would render nugatory "the Re-
statement sections dealing with employer control over the activity
of independent contractors, §§ 409-29."'. 7 As a result, the Hurst
court held that the shipowner was not required to supervise the
stevedore and detect the dangerous condition of a cargo hook used
to discharge the vessel. Characterized as a variation on the theme
of non-delegable duties, this duty was found to have been abolished
modem rule still would not impose liability upon a vessel for open and obvious dangerous
conditions,
[wihether existing at [the] time control of the vessel is relinquished by the vessel
or arising afterwards with the knowledge of the vessel, if the danger is such that
the stevedore or shipyard would be expected to correct the condition in the course
of discharging its responsibility for the safety of the longshoreman or shipyard
worker.
Id. at 1112.
52 563 F.2d at 1113; see note 36 supra.
563 F.2d at 1113. The plaintiff contended that RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 414
(1965) required the imposition of a duty to supervise when the shipowner retained the right
to stop and inspect the work. See note 36 supra.
s' 563 F.2d at 1115.
554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
" 554 F.2d at 1249-50 & n.35.
" Id. at 1250 n.35.
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by section 905(b) .18 Instead, the third circuit chose to apply section
409 of the Second Restatement, and observed:
[T]his general rule well expresses the Congressional concern for
the practical operation of the Longshoremen's Act: shipowners
shall not be liable in damages for acts or omisions of stevedores or
employees of stevedores. . . . Therefore, unless one of the recog-
nized exceptions, § § 410-29 to the general rule that the employer
of the contractor has no duty applies, our application of § 409
means that [the defendant] cannot be held liable for the steve-
dore's unsafe method of operation in this case. 9
The court also rejected the applicability of sections 416 through
429, since these exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for
independent contractor's acts are not predicated upon the negli-
gence of the employer, but rather are rules of vicarious liability
imposing non-delegable duties." Finally, the court concluded that
the shipowner's retention of the right to stop and inspect the work
is not sufficient to charge the vessel with liability for the stevedore's
improper and unsafe methods of operation.
In contrast to the third and fourth circuits, the fifth circuit has
had little difficulty in construing sections 343 and 343A in favor of
shipowner nonliability. In Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading Ltd., 6,
the court refused to hold the shipowner liable in two separate suits
concerning injuries sustained by longshoremen as a direct result of
their employers' negligence in failing to properly ventilate the hold
and failing to adequately secure pallets on the ship's deck. In the
former case, the court held that the 1972 amendments required
dismissal, since the plaintiff's claim was based upon the theory that
the vessel had a duty to provide a safe place to work, a concept
a'id.
5, Id. at 1250. The first circuit in Anderson v. Iceland Steamship Co., 525 F.2d 1142 (1st
Cir. 1978), adopted a position closely analogous to that of the third circuit in Hirsch. In
Anderson, the court reversed the denial of a directed verdict and dismissed the complaint on
appeal of a longshoreman/checker who claimed to have slipped on fish gurry on the pier in
the vicinity of the vessel during discharge operations. The first circuit expressly reserved
decision on whether §§ 343, 343A of the Second Restatement are applicable to longshoremen's
personal injury cases under the 1972 Amendments. The court did find, however, that § § 409-
415, of the Second Restatement dealing with the liability of an employer of an independent
contractor were relevant to the longshoreman/shipowner/stevedore situation. The court held
that § 414A, which was the most favorable section to the plaintiff's cause, did not permit a
finding of liability since "there was no showing of any duty on the vessel to be aware of and
correct dangerous conditions existing for approximately two days on the dock."
"* 554 F.2d at 1250-51.
81 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
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specifically negated by the amendments.2 In the latter situation,
dismissal was ordered notwithstanding a crewmember's knowledge
of the unsafe condition, since the stevedore had both created the
condition and failed to remedy it. Although the court's decision in
Gay was premised upon the fact that the plaintiff was not required
to face the danger despite knowledge, 3 a different result did not
obtain in a later decision by the same court where the hazard was
unavoidable. In Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp.,4 a barge
which the plaintiff's employer had contracted to free of gas exploded
while he was working on board. The court found that the dangerous
gas condition was known to all parties, but that "the plaintiff...
was 'the person best able to appreciate the potential consequences
of the danger."' 65
Unlike the other courts of appeals which have been discussed,
the ninth circuit has not seen fit to apply or even refer to the stan-
dards set out in the Second Restatement. Rather, that court has
emphasized the degree of knowledge and control of the shipowner,
62 Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1242.
6 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 489 (1978).
559 F.2d at 1034 (quoting Brown v. Mitsubishi, Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 334 (5th
Cir. 1977)). It should be noted that the fifth circuit has continued to utilize § 343A, with
results which are in accord with Anuszewski and Hurst. See, e.g., Brown v. Mitsubishi
Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977), wherein the court held that the safety and
health regulations applicable to stevedoring operations, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.2 (1977), placed the
responsibility for compliance on the stevedore-employer, and that a breach of those regula-
tions could not be used as a predicate for the imposition of liability on a shipowner-defendant.
550 F.2d at 333. Moreover, the court held that there was no duty owed by the ship to the
plaintiff even assuming that the dangerous condition which caused the injury was known to
the shipowner. Id. at 333-34. Relying heavily on Gay, the court stressed that the dangerous
condition was created by the stevedore's employees and it was therefore these employees who
were in the best position to abate the danger. Id. at 334. Applying § § 343 and 343A, the court
concluded that when these two factors were considered along with the plaintiff's own aware-
ness of the hazard and his personal control over it, this was not the type of danger which must
be faced despite knowledge. 550 F.2d at 334-35.
In Briley v. Charente S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1978), the court, following Gay and
Brown, found that the injury was caused solely by the stevedore's negligence because the
condition was known to the plaintiff, and, regardless of knowledge by ship's personnel, the
stevedore's employees were in the best position to correct the danger but refused to do so. Id.
at 499-500. In Wiles v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1978), the court reversed
and remanded a case in which judgment had been entered for the shipowner after a non-jury
trial because the trial court had not considered § 343A of the Second Restatement. Id. at 1339.
Finally, in Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978),
a case involving a latent defect known to the ship's personnel and some of the longshoremen,
but not the plaintiff, the court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The court found-that
there was ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the shipowner knew of the
dangerous condition, failed to either warn or alleviate it and should have realized that the
longshoreman would not discover or realize the danger. Id. at 886.
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stevedore and longshoreman. While the ninth circuit has not chosen
to rely on the Second Restatement, its decisions have been consis-
tent with those of the other circuits. In Wescott v. Impresas Arma-
doras S.A. Panama,66 for example, the court followed the fifth,
fourth and third circuits in proclaiming that "the vessel owner owes
no duty to protect or to warn the stevedoring company or its employ-
ees against dangerous conditions in their equipment arising in the
course [of] performing their contractual duties on board the
ship."67 Similarly, in Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co.,68 the
court reversed a denial of a directed verdict for the shipowner be-
cause there was ample evidence of negligence on the part of the
stevedore and no evidence that the injury was "attributable to any
act or omission of" the shipowner.69 In Davison, the plaintiff long-
shoreman was injured while he was engaged in discharging a cargo
of urea. The stevedore-employer was shown to have had firsthand
knowledge of the dangers incident to the discharge of this type of
cargo and control over the method of discharge utilized, while the
shipowner had no knowledge of the possible safety hazards. 7° As a
result, the court concluded:
For this court to uphold plaintiffs verdict and ignore the fact that
[the stevedore] had control of the unloading process, had know-
lege of the nature 'and attendant dangers of the cargo, and by
proper unloading techniques [the stevedore] could have pre-
vented the injury to Davison is to ignore the proximate cause of
this accident.'
It is apparent that the consistent philosophy and uniformity of
result in the decisions of the various courts of appeals have been
reached via divergent routes. The fifth and fourth circuits have
approved the use of section 343 of the Second Restatement. Section
343A has been adopted by the fifth circuit, discussed and ques-
tioned by the fourth circuit and rejected by the third circuit. So too,
section 409 has been recognized by the third circuit as the generally
applicable standard in longshoreman's personal injury suits; a con-
clusion concurred in by the fourth circuit but apparently not by the
fifth circuit. The ninth circuit has expressly reserved decision on the
564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 883 (quoting Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1251-52 (3d Cir. 1977)).
't 569 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 509 n.1.
7o Id. at 513.
" Id. at 514.
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applicability of these sections, focusing instead on the knowledge
and control of the stevedore.
Thus, the Second Restatement provisions, originally invoked to
foster uniformity of decision, have led to at least a technical division
of the circuits. These provisions have been read and applied in light
of the legislative history, however, to the effect that the shipowner
may reasonably rely on the stevedore to remedy and warn against
dangers within its knowledge and control. Moreover, the courts have
recognized the intent of Congress to place the duty of care on the
party best able to prevent the accident. Consequently, there should
be no recovery against a vessel when the longshoreman's injuries are
caused by the stevedore's negligence in the conduct of its operation
or in failing to alleviate dangerous conditions which are or should
be known by the stevedore and are within its control.
More than a mere technical inconsistency, however, obtains
within the second circuit. Initially, in Napoli v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd.,7 2 the court held that a longshoreman, who was required by his
job to work on snow-covered plywood, apparently placed on deck by
the ship's crew, could pursue an action for negligence against his
employer who was both the shipowner and stevedore. The Napoli
court reversed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
trial court had erroneously charged the jury that if it found the
condition was known to the plaintiff it should return a verdict in
favor of the defendant. The court relied on section 343A of the
Second Restatement in reaching this conclusion, stating that "a
charge which relieves a shipowner of liability for a dangerous condi-
tion which was 'known to the stevedore or to any of its employees'
is clearly inappropriate where the shipowner, itself, is the steve-
dore. 713 The Napoli court added in dicta, however, that "[u]nder
72 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 508. Since the shipowner was acting as its own stevedore, the court did not
consider principles of law regarding independent contractors. For this reason, several later
decisions limited Napoli to its special facts. See, e.g., Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolom-
biana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1978); Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A.,
553 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1977). The House Report, H.R. REP. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4698, seems to indicate that it was the
intent of Congress that a longshoreman employed directly by the ship not be prevented from
bringing suit against his employer. His rights "should not depend on whether he was em-
ployed directly by the vessel or by an independent contractor." Id. at 7,4705; see Robertson,
Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 447, 477-
78 (1976), wherein the author states that the language of the House committee report, to-
gether with that of § 905(b), clearly indicates Congress' intent that "the longshoreman em-
ployee of a stevedore/shipowner have a tort action provided the negligence that hurt him was
of non-longshoring personnel." Accord, Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, 546 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
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this rule, a vessel is liable to longshoremen only for injuries resulting
from obvious dangers which it should reasonably anticipate that the
longshoremen would be unable to avoid. '7 4
In contrast, in Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolumbiana,
S.A., '7 5 the same court recognized that a shipowner may reasonably
rely on the stevedore to take adequate precautions to prevent the
creation of latent dangers during loading and unloading and to rec-
tify those that do exist. Reading sections 343 and 343A of the Second
Restatement in light of the express intent of Congress that the ship-
owner not be held responsible for the negligence of the independent
stevedore," the court stated:
1977). But see Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1977), wherein
the court appears to interpret § 905(b) as barring the longshoreman employed directly by the
vessel from bringing a negligence action against the shipowner.
" 536 F.2d at 509. The court stated further that use of this standard would not constitute
a departure from the direction of Congress that principles of negligence rather than strict
liability should apply. Id. But see Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d
798 (2d Cir. 1978). The court also required that the plaintiff offer evidence sufficient to show
that his "attention [would] be distracted" or his duties as an employee requireldi his
unavoidable exposure to [the condition]." 536 F.2d at 508. As support for this approach, the
court cited § 343A of the Restatement (Second) Torts, see note 36 supra, which would relieve
the possessor of land from liability for obvious dangers, unless he "should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness." When read together with comment (f) of this section,
however, the strict application of this formula to shipowner/longshoreman actions does not
appear to be warranted. The several examples given by the commentator to illustrate applica-
tion of this principle concern such persons as store customers who could conceivably be
distracted by displays designed specifically for that purpose, and customers who leave super-
markets carrying large packages which may block their view of potential-hazards. None of
the examples given pertains to an invitee in a position analogous to that of the longshore-
man-someone whose chosen occupation often demands his presence in dangerous situations,
and whose work requires a particular expertise. It does not seem logical that the shipowner,
who has contracted with the stevedore to have expert work performed on his ship, can
reasonably anticipate that the latter's employee will "forget [the dangers] he has discov-
ered." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 343A, Comment f (1965). The commentator also
suggests that the possessor of land may be liable if he believes that the invitee will encounter
the danger because he reasonably believes the advantages of doing so appear to outweigh the
apparent risk. Id. It is submitted that it is unrealistic to expect the shipowner to assume that
the independent contractor would order his men to continue working under conditions that.
constitute violations of the OSHA Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring. See Brown
v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading
Corp., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977); note 124 infra.
,5 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977).
,1 Id. at 841. The court was of the opinion that charging the shipowner with the negli-
gence of the stevedore would destroy the stevedore's incentive "to monitor unsafe proce-
dures," id., since under the LHWCA the stevedore is now immune from indemnity suits
brought against him by the shipowner. Id.
This view is supported by further comments on the standard of care made by Chief Judge
Kaufman:
Shipping companies engage stevedores to load and unload goods from their ships
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It would, in our view, contravene the clear congressional intent and
scheme to approve recovery against Grancolumbiana in this case.
The shipowner had no duty to supervise the minute details of work
totally entrusted to the competence of the stevedore. Indeed, com-
mercial reality and applicable union regulations preclude a rule
that would require a non-expert constantly to intrude on the work
of a master stevedore in the deepest recesses of the ship."
That the principles of Munoz were not limited to cases of latent
defects was demonstrated by the court in Hickman v. Jugoslavenska
Linijska Plovidba Rijeka "Zvir".7 The Hickman court held that
actual notice of an allegedly dangerous condition was insufficient to
impose any duty upon the shipowner." The court further stated:
The dichotomy of latent and obvious defects referred to in the
cases is not always controlling or pertinent in determining the
liability of the shipowner.
. . .Since the loading operation was not under the control of
the shipowner, the mate had no right to interfere with the loading.
• . . He had a right to rely upon the expertise of the steve-
because the work requires unusual expertise. In addition, the regulations of the
International Longshoreman's Association prohibit crew members of foreign flag
ships . . . from performing this type of labor.
Id. at 838. In Ruffino v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 559 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1977), the
second circuit extended the Munoz rule to cover a condition created by an outport stevedore,
holding that the shipowner could not be liable on a theory of constructive notice of a space
in the stow placed there by an independent contractor. Id. at 862-63.
" 553 F.2d at 840-41. The stevedore, Universal Maritime Services (UMS), had con-
tracted with the defendant-shipowner to load and unload goods, a task which requires
"unusual expertise." Id. at 838. Munoz, employed by UMS, was ordered to work in the hold.
He attempted to reach the hold via hatch no. 3, but could not because the forward escape
hatch was blocked by cargo. He took an alternate route which required him to use a pathway
from which he fell. Id. Since the stowing of the cargo in the lower hold was the duty of UMS
and the pathway had been built in order to facilitate the longshoremen's work, the court
stated that it "would be remiss in [its] duty . . . if [it] required the owner to pay for the
stevedore's negligence." Id. at 841. It would appear that the crowded condition created by
the work crew constituted a violation of the OSHA Safety and Health Regulations for Long-
shoring, in particular, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.21(i) (1977). That section provides in pertinent part
that "the means of access shall be so located that drafts of cargo do not pass over it. In any
event loads shall not be passed over the means of access while employees are on it." It should
be noted further that the regulations specifically provide that "Itihe responsibility for com-
pliance with the requirements of this part is placed upon 'employers.'" Id. § 1918.2(a).
79 570 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
7" Id. at 451. The Hickman court held that, inasmuch as the shipowner had not con-
tracted to supply dunnage, "it was the stevedore who was responsible for the safety of the
longshoremen and it was his duty to supply [the] dunnage." Id. at 452; see Bess v. Agromar
Line, 518 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1975); Citizen v. MN Triton, 384 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Tex. 1974);
Fedison v. Vessel Wislica, 382 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1974). "0
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dore .... The longshoremen were acutely aware of the condition
and the stevedore, their employer, was in the best position to rem-
edy the same. °
After Hickman, the law in the second circuit seemed to be
developing in a manner consistent with the other circuits. Long-
shoreman injuries caused by improper stevedore activities were not
the responsibility of the shipowner. Munoz, in its citation of deci-
sions from other circuits, seemed to recognize that this principle
applied even when the shipowner knew of the dangerous condition,
since it is the stevedore which bears the primary responsibility for
conducting safe operations and is in the best position to rectify
dangerous conditions within the longshoremen's work area. Napoli
seemingly was limited by Munoz and Hickman to dangerous con-
ditions which were not only open and obvious, but also within the
shipowner's control, and not of the stevedore's making. Finally,
while the second circuit initially placed great reliance on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,"1 the court thereafter demonstrated
little concern for adherence to its principles. Rather, the Munoz,
Ruffino and Hickman panels analyzed the relationship of the steve-
dore and shipowner, concluding in each instance that the shipowner
was not at fault because the stevedore's expertise and control justi-
fied the vessel's reliance and precluded the Vessel's interference.
Two weeks after the decision in Hickman, however, the second
circuit handed down the first in a series of controversial and contra-
dictory opinions. In Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co.,8 2 the
court, over a vigorous dissent by Judge Moore, reversed and re-
manded a directed verdict for the shipowner, finding that the evi-
dence presented could support the conclusion that a ship's officer,
after notification of a dangerous condition, directed the longshore-
men to work or affirmatively joined in the stevedore's direction that
the work should continue.83 Such action by the officer would, ac-
" 570 F.2d at 451-52 (citation omitted). The court explicitly stated that the dangerous
condition had been created by the negligence of the stevedore in improperly loading the ship
and, despite its knowledge of the condition, failed to remedy it. Id. at 452.
" See Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1976).
" 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 367. Lubrano claimed that his injury was caused by the absence of dunnage. Id.
at 369. On the day of his accident, Lubrano was assisting in the stowage of "greasy drums of
tallow in the hold of defendant's vessel." During the course of this loading, it became appar-
ent that there was insufficient dunnage to cover the greasy cargo. Id. The members of the
gang allegedly complained to the hatch boss and stevedore foreman. These men then in-
formed the ship's officer because the ship had contractually agreed to supply dunnage to the
stevedore. Id. The officer attempted to procure additional dunnage but before it was available
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cording to the majority, present a jury question of shipowner liabil-
ity under section 343A of the Second Restatement.4
In his dissent, Judge Moore found that the majority's interpre-
tation was factually unsound and legally unacceptable. Citing as a
"factual error" the majority's assumption that the shipowner re-
tained power to direct the stevedore's employees, Judge Moore con-
cluded that the majority's result was contrary to post-amendment
law.85 It was this "contrary-to-fact assumption," he reasoned, which
resulted in the majority's "holding that a shipowner, having...
relinquished the control to the independent contractor, must stand
by to countermand the stevedore's directions lest it be charged with
joining in."86 The dissent also criticized the majority's use of section
343A, noting that this section must be read in light of the congres-
sional intent underlying the 1972 Amendments.87
Following Lubrano, the second circuit once again, in a unani-
mous opinion written by Judge Moore, attempted to free itself of the
restraints necessarily imposed by sections 343 and 343A of the
plaintiff slipped and fell while working on top of the first tier of drums. Id. at 365. The critical
factual dispute concerned the reaction of the ship's officer to the news that the longshoremen
needed additional dunnage. The hatch boss had testified, somewhat inconsistently, that the
officer had told them to "wait" and that the stevedore and ship owner had told him "to do
the best we can until we get sohiething that we could work with," a phrase the Lubrano
majority interpreted as indicating that the officer had directed the men to work or had
affirmatively joined in the stevedore's decision. Id. at 367.
81 Id. The question to be presented to the jury was whether the vessel, through its officer,
had ordered the work to proceed notwithstanding the knowledge of the dangerous condition.
If the jury answered in the affirmative, the vessel would be liable for its negligent failure to
prevent the injury which it should have anticipated. Id.
Id. at 369 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore criticized the majority for its implied
determination that the shipowner, if in fact an officer had ordered the work to continue, had
any authority to so direct the longshoremen. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting). He was of the opinion
that such a finding would require that a shipowner oversee the operations and exercise control
of the work or be charged with responsibility for the stevedore's improper directions. Id.
(Moore, J., dissenting); see Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798, 804
(2d Cir. 1978), wherein the court stated that the conclusion derived from the "overwhelming
decisional authority," is that the "shipowner had no duty to supervise the operation entrusted
to the stevedore." Id. at 804. But see Slaughter v. S.S. Ronde, 390 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Ga.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 509 F.2d 793 (5th Cir, 1975). For a critical treatment of Slaughter,
see Comment, Business Invitee Doctrine Used to Define Vessel's Standard of Care Under
Section 905(b) of the 1972 Amendments, 7 RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 147, 153-54 (1975) [hereinafter
referred to as Vessel's Standard of Care].
m 572 F.2d at 369 (Moore, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 372 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore believed that the proper interpretation
would therefore be that "no liability will arise for obvious defects." Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
In addition, he noted that "the special characteristics of the [Act] preclude unthinking
adherence to § 343A alone or to a literal reading thereof." 572 F.2d at 372 (Moore, J.,
dissenting).
1972 AMENDMENTS TO LHWCA
Second Restatement and reiterated the Hickman panel's observa-
tion that the labels "latent" and "open and obvious" do not repre-
sent the beginning and end of all analysis of the proper standard of
care to be imposed on shipowners under the LHWCA.5 More impor-
tant, according to the court in Cox v. Flota Merchante
Grancolumbiana,81 is the knowledge of the stevedore, the relation-
ship of the accident to the stevedoring operations and the control
exercised by the stevedore and the shipowner." Accordingly, the
Cox court limited Napoli to its special facts and distinguished
Lubrano based on the absence, in Cox, of evidence indicating that
the shipowner had instructed the longshoremen to continue working
or affirmatively joined in the stevedore's decision to do so.' Rather,
the court concluded that it was the stevedore's decision alone to
continue working despite a dangerous situation, since "[it] was the
stevedore which had exclusive control of the gangs and how, when
and where they worked. 91 2 Since the responsibility for the safety of
the longshoremen rested with the stevedore and since the shipowner
was not charged with a duty to supervise the stevedore's operation,
the court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and dismissed the
complaint. 3
Although the panel in Cox distinguished Lubrano, the validity
of that distinction was questioned 3 weeks after the Cox decision
was announced, when another second circuit panel, with Judge
u Cox v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 798, 802 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978).
" 577 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1978).
"Id. at 802-04.
, Id. at 802. In Cox, evidence was presented that the plaintiff was injured when a hatch
beam which had not been secured was dislodged in the course of cargo operations and fell to
the lower hold striking the plaintiff. Id. at 799. Two supervisory employees of the stevedore
testified that, before the accident occurred, they had been aware of the unsecured nature of
the beams and had informed a mate who purportedly assured them that the crew would put
pins in the beam locks. Id. at 800. It would appear that the stevedore, by virtue of continuing
the unloading despite his awareness of the possible injury, violated the OSHA Safety and
Health Regulations for Longshoring. Section 1918.43 (3)(e) provides in pertinent part that
"any beam. . . shall be. .. secured so that it cannot be displaced by accident." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1918.43(3)(e) (1977). Compliance with this regulation is the stevedore's responsibility. Id.
§ 1918.2(a); see Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 391 F. Supp. 1143, 1145
(D. Md. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098
(1977), discussed in notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
12 577 F.2d at 802.
' Id. at 804. After reviewing the decisions of the second and other circuits, id. at 801-04,
the Cox court held that it was the expert stevedore's sole responsibility as an independent
contractor to remedy the condition as the Safety and Health Regulations required. Id. at 804.
It further held that since the operation was not under the control of the shipowner, it was
not liable for the stevedore's negligence in failing to take adequate precautions. Id.
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Friendly dissenting, decided Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc. 4 There,
the majority, in a footnote which has been characterized as "most
unusual, 9 5 stated that it viewed Cox as in conflict with Lubrano
and acknowledged that "the result in Cox cannot reasonably be
reconciled with our result here by the differences in the factual
situations .... "96 In Canizzo, the court affirmed a non-jury deter-
mination that the shipowner was liable for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, on the grounds that the shipowner should have been or was
aware of grease and wires allegedly encumbering the main deck of
the vessel and did not remedy the condition. 7
" 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Oct. 31, 1978).
Bongiovanni v. N.V. Stoomvart-Maats "Dostzee," No. 77-1316, slip op. at 7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 1978).
11 579 F.2d at 686 n.3. In his dissent, Judge Friendly noted that the district judges could
"scarcely be expected to function" now that the Canizzo majority failed to adhere to the
decision in Cox. See also Feinberg, Judicial Administration: Stepchild of the Law, 52 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 187, 190 (1978). Such practical considerations underlie the doctrines of stare
decisis. See Gurfein, Appellate Advocacy, Modern Style, 4 J. ABA Section of Litigation 9
(1978). As Judge Cardozo observed some 50 years ago:
The situation would . . . be intolerable if the weekly changes in the composition
of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings. In such circumstances
there is nothing to do except to stand by the errors of our brethren of the week before
. .. I think that a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found
to be inconsistent with the sense of justice . . . there should be less hesitation in
frank avowal and full abandonment.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-50 (1921). Judge Cardozo's observa-
tions attain even greater cogency when they are applied to situations like Cox and Canizzo,
where the second ruling represents a divergence from the decision of sister circuits.
In Talliercio v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 451 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), district court
Judge Bonsal attempted to reconcile Cox and Canizzo on the ground that the hazard in
Canizzo was not "so connected with the stevedore's expertise that 'the shipowner Ishouldl
defer to the competence of the stevedore.'" Id. at 951-52. In Cox, however, securing hatch
beams was peculiarly within the province of the stevedore's expertise to which the ship-
owner could reasonably defer. Id. The court additionally pointed out that the injury in
Canizzo resulted from the "affirmative act" of the ship's crew in placing wires on top of the
greasy deck while, in Talliercio, the court concluded, there was no affirmative act. Id. at 951.
The court also reviewed the facts in Lubrano, stating that if it were determined that the
ship's officer had directed or joined in the stevedore's direction to the longshoremen to
continue working, this would have constituted an "affirmative act" on the part of the ship.
Id. at 951 n.1.
97 579 F.2d at 684. The lower court found that the shipowner's negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. The ship's crew had placed cluster light wires on top of a patch
of grease, thereby exacerbating the dangerous condition. When placing the wires on the deck,
the crew noticed or should have noticed the existence of a greasy surface. Id.
It should be noted that the House committee report, H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4704, in illustrating the
application of the principles to be followed in accordance with § 905(b) as amended, refers
to facts which a longshoreman must prove in order to hold a shipowner liable for negligence
when the longshoreman slips and is injured on an oily deck. The report provides that in such
a situation, the longshoreman must prove that the vessel either created or should have known
of the dangerous condition, and willfully or negligently failed to remove it. Id. It is further
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The majority, without discussing the substantial case law of the
other circuits, relied solely on section 343A and held that if the
shipowner had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous con-
dition, it had a duty to remedy it or warn of it, without regard for
the shipowner's reasonable reliance on the independent expert
stevedore.18 The only exception to this rule allowed by the court was
for injuries caused by a condition actually created by the steve-
dore.9"
In his dissent, Judge Friendly warned of the dangers of the
overbroad theories of liability propounded by the majority:
Unless the courts keep the longshoremen's negligence action
against the ship within proper bounds, the ship's situation will be
worse in some respects than before since it will be deprived of its
former third party action against the longshoremen's employer.
Moreover, the increased compensation payments, which Congress
conceived as the usual source of making the longshoremen whole,
will absorb a still larger share of his recovery against the ship with
the consequent attenuation of any benefit to the injured worker.
And all this despite the fact that the employer is generally in a far
better position than the ship to prevent accidents to its employ-
ees.
o00
Criticizing the majority's use of sections 343 and 343A of the
Second Restatement, Judge Friendly suggested the use of a simpler
statement of the shipowner's responsibilities based on his interpre-
stated that the shipowner "will not be chargeable with the negligence of the stevedore." Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1918.38 (1977) provides that "[ilf decks are wet with. . .oil, the employer shall
not permit employees to engage in longshoring operations until necessary walking and work-
ing areas have been made safe by the use of suitable non-skid materials." Further, id. §
1918.91(c) provides that "[s]lippery conditions shall be eliminated as they occur." The
responsibility for compliance with these regulations rests with the stevedore. Id. § 1918.2(a).
In light of the foregoing, it is difficult to understand how the defendant in Canizzo could
reasonably be held liable for its failure to anticipate that the stevedore would act in violation
of the applicable OSHA Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring.
579 F.2d at 685.
Id. The court left open the question of the shipowner's liability when it has knowledge
of a dangerous condition created by the negligence of the stevedore. Id.
"0 Id. at 687-88. (Friendly, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly pointed out that even if the
ship's personnel were aware of the patches of grease, their knowledge could be imputed to
the vessel only if they had a duty, by reason of the existence of an agency relationship, to
inform the shipowner. Id. at 690 (Friendly, J., dissenting). This duty might arise if the
employees of the vessel who "should have" been aware were ship's officers, but there was no
proof that such was the case. Id. (Friendly, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly also pointed out
that it was reasonable for the shipowner to rely on the stevedore's acting in compliance with
the OSHA Regulations. See note 77 supra.
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tation of the legislative intent underlying the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA:' 0'
Congress did not mean to subject the ship to liability for every
dangerous condition known or knowable to it when it had a right
to assume that this would be remedied by the employer, as § 941(a)
requires. The typical cases where the ship was to be liable under §
905(b) would be for conditions of which it was or should have been
aware but of which the employer was not and could not reasonably
be expected to be and for affirmative acts of negligence for which
the employer bore no responsibility .... 02
In the latest decision in the series, Lopez v. A/S DIS Svend-
borg,'03 a panel consisting of a single circuit judge and two district
court judges paid lip service to Judge Friendly's warning and
reversed a directed verdict for the shipowner where shifted cargo
with spilled contents was discovered by the stevedore and was
brought to the attention of a ship's officer."4
Rejecting the Munoz interpretation that Congress through the
1972 amendments sought "encouragement of safety within the in-
dustry by placing the duty of care on the party best able to prevent
accidents,"'' 5 the Lopez court chose as its polestar the concept that
,0, 579 F.2d at 688 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Friendly, J., dissenting).
581 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
10 Id. at 330. The foreman told the stevedore hatch boss to "[kleep working, .... buti
tell your men to be careful." Id. at 321. The ship's officer was present when this instruction
was given, but did not utter a word. Id. The only apparent cause of the shifting was heavy
seas, which may have been encountered during the ocean voyage to the United States. Id.
"o Id. at 327. The court stated that since the stevedore "shared in the decision to con-
tinue working" it might be held liable for its own negligence. Id. at 324. At most this state-
ment indicates that the stevedore's and shipowner's concurrent negligence contributed to the
plaintiff's injuries. Such a scenario has, in some cases, resulted in a reduction of the third
party's liability to one-half of the judgment, based on an analogy to settlements between a
plaintiff and one of two tortfeasors, see Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Vickery, Some
Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's & Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act, 41 INs. COUNCIL J. 63, 66-67 (1974).
In the context of the 1972 amendments, the ninth circuit and the fifth circuit have
rejected the argument that a longshoreman's recovery should be reduced when the stevedore
was concurrently negligent. Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884
(5th Cir. 1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Toyko, 528 F:2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). The second circuit applied this principle in
affirming the denial of a shipowner's motion to join the stevedore-employer as a necessary
party under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). The third circuit has discussed but not decided the issue.
Marant v. Farrel Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977).
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it is the shipowner who is "in a better position to distribute the
loss."' " The panel held, in express conflict with Munoz and its
progeny, that the shipowner has a non-delegable duty to provide the
longshoreman with a safe place to work.0 7 Rejecting the Cox holding
that the shipowner "cannot be held liable for negligence toward
plaintiff because it was entitled to rely on the [stevedore] . . .to
alleviate any condition dangerous to its employees,"'' 8 the court
found irrelevant "the independent contractor's control over the
work and the place where the work is done."'0 9 It further found that
since the 1972 amendments eliminated indemnity, "to enable a
shipowner to escape liability by entering an agreement with the
stevedore would contravene Congress' intention." 0 Finally, the
court concluded that section 413 of, the Second Restatement
In the leading decision limiting a longshoreman's recovery, Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977), modified on rehearing en banc, 577
F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3310 (Nov. 7, 1978), the original panel held
that the shipowner would only be responsible for that portion of the judgment which equal-
led the shipowner's percentage of fault plus the amount of the stevedore's lien. The panel
found four principles which were applicable to the decision of the case. First, the Congress,
in 1972, sought to eliminate the type of circuitous litigation which prevailed prior to the en-
actment of the 1972 amendments. Second, the stevedore has a lien, equitable or statutory,
on any recovery by one of its employees against a third party. Third, the longshoreman is
entitled to bring an action against a shipowner based on the negligence of the shipowner.
Fourth, the shipowner is responsible for its own, not the stevedore's negligence. In cases of
concurrent negligence of shipowner and stevedore, the third and fourth principles are har-
monized by allowing suit but limiting recovery to the percentage of fault attributable to the
shipowner. The second principle was protected by the continuation of the stevedore's lien
regardless of its fault. Finally, the court found that the "simple reduction of the vessel's
liability" will not result in the circuitous litigation sought to be abolished by the 1972
Amendments.
On rehearing en banc, this decision was modified by restricting the shipowner's lia-
bility to the percentage of damages which equalled -its percentage of fault, and reserving
decision on the extent and viability of the stevedore's lien because the stevedore was not a
party to the action.
"I Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978).
WI Id. at 323-25.
'cs Id. at 327-28.
' Id. at 328. It would appear that the court did not consider the obligations of the
stevedore to keep working areas "reasonably clear" of "loose tripping or stumbling hazards."
29 C.F.R. § 1918.91(a) (1977); see Vessel's Standard of Care, supra note 85, at 156, wherein
the author criticizes adherence to a theory that would permit a finding of negligence on the
part of a shipowner, when the stevedore was fully cognizant of the dangerous condition, The
author would, in addition, impose upon the longshoremen the responsibility of insisting "that
work methods are tailored to meet these developing dangers," since they are "normally the
first to observe new or existing dangers." Id.
"0 581 F.2d at 328. Any agreement which by its nature would purport to hold the
shipowner harmless is "prohibited as a matter of public policy," since "vessels by their
superior economic strength could circumvent and nullify the provision . . . by requiring in-
demnification from a covered employer for employee injuries." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4704.
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contains the appropriate standard by which to measure shipowner
liability."'
Thus, the judges of the second circuit are on an admitted and
obvious collision course on the standard of care issue. While it re-
mains to be seen whether this conflict within the second circuit will
be resolved by that court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court,"2
the eventual resolution of this conflict seems inevitable.
THE ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS OF CARE
There emerge from the cases two alternative standards of care
under the 1972 amendments:
(1) That the shipowner has a duty to remedy or warn of condi-
tions of which it has or should have knowledge and of which the
stevedore is not and could not reasonably be expected to be aware,
"1 581 F.2d at 324. Section 413 of the Second Restatement provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of
physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the em-
ployer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take precau-
tions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for
the taking of such precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965). The Lopez holding is also in conflict with the
decision of the court in Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 935 (1967). The Lipka court, when faced with an issue similar to that in Lopez, refused
to hold that the employee of a negligent independent contractor comes within the protective
provisions of the Second Restatement which would permit an injured party to sue the contrac-
tor's employer notwithstanding the "inherent dangers" involved in the work. Id. at 292-93;
see Galbraith v. United States, 296 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1961); Wallach v. United States,
291 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 935 (1961). Lipka was later followed in Hess
v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586
(Mar. 21, 1978), where the court held that §§ 410 to 415 of the Second Restatement only
apply to third parties, not to "an employee of [an] independent contracto[r]." 559 F.2d at
1033. The Hess court reviewed the language used in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRm § 411
(1965), which refers to the liability of the independent contractor's employer to "third per-
sons," as distinguished from § § 413, 416 and 427, which concern his liability "to others." 559
F.2d at 1033. The court noted that while the use of the word "others" may mean that the
employee of an independent contractor should be considered to be within the protection of
the latter sections, the majority of courts have held otherwise. Id. at 1033-35. The courts
which would allow such an action, e.g., Lindler v. District of Columbia, 502 F.2d 495 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), were classified by the Hess court as representing "a minority view of land-based
law which has been undermined by the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act." 559
F.2d at 1034; accord, Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., OIY, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978).
"I Petitions for a writ of certiorari have been denied in Cox, - U.S.L.W. - ( ),
and Canizzo, 47 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Oct. 31, 1978). A request for a rehearing en banc in Lopez
has also been denied.
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and to refrain from affirmative acts of negligence not the responsi-
bility of the stevedore;' or
(2) The Lopez position that the shipowner is responsible to
remedy or warn of any condition known to it, without regard to the
shipowner's reliance on the expert stevedore. Beyond warning, the
non-expert shipowner must remedy any condition known to it which
it should reasonably anticipate the longshoremen employees of the
master stevedore would be unable to avoid despite their control of,
familiarity with, and ability to reduce or remove the risk of injury.14
In examining these competing standards of care, it is important
to consider the policies which prompted Congress to adopt the 1972
amendments."' The policy argument providing the underpinnings
for the standard of care proffered by the Lopez court was the belief
that the shipowner is in a better position to distribute the loss.,,6
This position, however, has been recognized since the decision of the
Supreme Court in Sieracki as the basic foundation of a theory of
HI Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 688 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Oct. 31, 1978); see Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d
1103, 1110-12 (4th Cir. 1977); Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 144 (3d Cir. 1977);
Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Ivarans
Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854, 860 (3d Cir. 1976).
' Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1978).
1s Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Oct. 31, 1978). The goals sought to be achieved by
Congress were concisely listed by the court in Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana
S.A., 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977). Among them are "adequate, increased and sure compensa-
tion for injured longshoremen, elimination of the rubric of liability without fault for shipown-
ers, and encouragement of safety within the industry by placing the duty of care on the party
best able to prevent accidents." Id. at 839.
"I Lopez v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 581 F.2d 319, 327 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978). This conclusion is
not supported by the authority cited by the court, Comment, Risk Administration in the
Marketplace: A Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 661
(1973), which concludes that neither employers as a class nor independent contractors as a
class are always better able to distribute the cost of the risk. Id. at 672. The author contends
that "courts cannot easily identify a single party who is better able to accomplish [the]
objectives [of] prevention, distribution and compensation." Id. at 669. Assuming arguendo
that a court "might theoretically be able to identify the proper party on whom to impose
liability, the task imposes great difficulties in practice and creates an overly complex and
unpredictable body of law." Id. The commentator further states:
All traditional approaches to vicarious liability. . . are grounded in generali-
zations about parties to the employment agreement. They assume that one class
of defendants has deeper pockets, more control, or greater ability to distribute risk
than some other class. Insofar as contractors and employers are concerned, these
generalizations are of questionable validity.
Id. at 674. Although a case-by-case inquiry to determine the party best able to "distribute
and prevent risk" might be more equitable than a categorical rule, such a standard "may
not be within the competence of any court to make and, in any event, [would involve] high
administrative costs." Id. at 674-75.
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strict liability without fault.1 17 As Chief Justice Stone stated: "The
whole philosophy of liability without fault is that losses which are
incidental to socially desirable conduct should be placed on those
best able to bear them.""' Justice Stone's remarks are peculiarly
appropriate to the 1972 amendments, since the House committee
noted that "assuring that the employer bears the cost of unsafe
conditions, serves to strengthen the employer's incentive to provide
the fullest measure of on-the-job safety.""' As recognized by Chief
Judge Kaufman in Munoz, 120 placing liability on the party best able
to prevent the harm is the foundation for liability predicated upon
fault. Thus, even assuming that the shipowner is in the best position
to bear the loss, to cause that loss to fall on the shipowner would
thwart the fundamental purpose of the 1972 amendments. 21
As stated by Judge Moore in his dissent in Lubrano:
The stevedore is in the best position to avoid the cost and
causes of accidents, and on its shoulders rests the primary respon-
sibility for the safety of [the] longshoreman. Such responsibility
is consistent with the promotion of safe working conditions and
economic efficiency. 2 2
Robertson has written that placing the responsibility on the
stevedore seems consonant with industry practice, since the ship-
owner typically has little control over the details of the loading and
117 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 108 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
1 Id. (Stone, C.J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Stone disagreed with the majority in Sieracki
on the ground that he believed that "Congress had made a determination that the employer
is best able to bear the loss." Id. (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
' H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE & CONG.
AD. NEWS 4698, 4699.
553 F.2d 837, 839 (2d Cir. 1977).
121 Further support for this position is found in the OSHA report, see note 32 supra, which
found that special problems in the longshoring industry are not the "hazardous and changing
work places" but the "inordinately poor industrial relations, ineffective supervision and a
long inbred tradition of doing things unsafely" on the part of stevedoring companies and their
employees.
122 572 F.2d at 371 (Moore, J., dissenting). It is the stevedore's ability to absorb the cost
of the loss through insurance that prompted several courts to hold that the longshoreman may
not recover from the shipowner for injuries sustained as a result of the stevedore's negligence.
See, e.g., Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288, 293 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935
(1967), wherein the court states that "[t]he principal justification for denying recovery to
employees of an independent contractor ... is that they are covered by workmen's compen-
sation, and that 'it is to be expected that the cost of the workmen's compensation insurance
will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the work.'" Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 17-18 (tent. Draft No. 7 1962)); accord, Hess v. Upper
Miss. Towing Co., 559 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1977); Eutsler Corp. v. United States, 376
F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir. 1967).
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unloading operation.123 In addition, he concedes that tradition as
well as the Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring put the
responsibility for these operations on the stevedore.' However,
Robertson argues if shipowners learn that they have duties to take
remedial action for conditions created by or within the control of the
stevedore, "the power or authority to take corrective action will
develop."' 2 To impose such a duty on shipowners, however, would
create chaos in the maritime industry since, as the courts have long
recognized, stevedore companies are expert in loading and discharg-
ing vessels, but shipowners are not. '
In addition, reliance on sections 343 and 343A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts is misplaced. As Judge Friendly has
pointed out:
In retrospect it seems to have been a mistake for courts to give
such talismanic significance to §§ 343 and 343A of the Restate-
ment of Torts 2d as has sometimes been done. These sections are
awkwardly drafted; the framers had no notion that they would be
applied to the tangled situations of shiploading or unloading; and
they must be read together with Chapter 15, 'Liability of an Em-
ployer of an Independent Contractor.'
In dealing with § 905(b), courts would do better to consider
the policies that actuated Congress in adopting the 1972 Amend-
ments. 12
I" Robertson, supra note 73, at 471, 475; accord, Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolom-
biana S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1977).
" Robertson, supra note 73, at 471; see Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d
331, 333 (5th Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1977); Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Md. 1975),
aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977). But see
Comment, Negligence Standards Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Examining the Viewpoints, 21 ViL. L. REv. 244, 269-70
(1975).
" Robertson, supra note 73, at 471. This position is discussed in Vessel's Standard of
Care, supra note 85. There the author reaches a contrary conclusion, stating that it is unrea-
sonable to place a "duty of care on the vessel which would require its officers to observe the
stevedore's operations closely and inform its supervisors and longshoremen employees of any
dangerous conditions they might create." Id. at 153; see Munoz v. Flota Merchante Granco-
lombiana S.A., 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977), wherein the court states that "commercial reality
and applicable union regulations preclude a rule that would require a non-expert constantly
to intrude on the work of a master stevedore in the deepest recesses of the ship." Id. at 840-
41; accord, Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1251-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 861 (1977).
" See Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449, 452 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 841
(2d Cir. 1977).
I" Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 688 (2d Cir.) (footnote omitted) (Friendly,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Oct. 31, 1978); see note 36 supra. In Hurst v.
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Moreover, the Reporter of the Second Restatement has stated that
these sections are based on the notion that "the obligation as to the
condition of the premises is of such importance that it can not be
delegated .... ,,128 Both committees in Congress expressly stated
that they intended "not to endow [the employee] with any special
maritime theory of liability under whatever judicial nomenclature
it may be called, such as 'unseaworthiness,' 'non-delegable duty,' or
the like.' 1 29
Just as sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts were not envisioned by the drafters to apply to the "tangled
situations of ship loading and unloading," the exceptions to section
409 of the Second Restatement dealing with independent contrac-
tors were not intended to apply to situations where suit is brought
by an employee of the independent contractor.'3 The express refer-
ence in chapter 15 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the
landowner's liability to "others" was not meant to bring such per-
sons within the exceptions, since they are covered by workmen's
compensation.' 31 Additionally, section 413, which requires special
precautions to be taken or contracted for when there is a peculiarly
unreasonable risk of harm, 32 is not applicable to loading and un-
loading conditions since the stevedore is in the best position to
recognize and remedy dangerous conditions. "Where working condi-
tions create obvious risks of injuries which might be lessened by a
more careful method of [stevedoring], the stevedore is required to
do whatever it reasonably can to minimize the danger, whether by
Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977), the court,
deeming the Second Restatement section applying to licensees as inapposite to the longshore-
man/shipowner situation, stated that "[sitevedores and their employees cannot be regarded
as licensees." 554 F.2d at 1249. That court would apply the sections dealing with independent
contractors because stevedores, "with respect to the work they perform for shipowners...
[are] independent contractors," and hence, a longshoreman would be classified by the Hurst
court as merely an employee of the independent contractor. Id.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 61, at 395 (4th ed. 1971).
"' H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE & CONG.
AD. NEWS 4698, 4703; S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
"3 See note 111 supra.
," See id.
i RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413(a), 413(b) (1965); see note 36 supra. Comment
a to § 413 provides that "[tlhis Section states the rule as to the liability of the employer
who fails to provide in the contract, or in some other manner, that the contractor shall take
the required precautions." It is submitted that since the contractor (stevedore) is already
bound to take the "required precautions" outlined in the OSHA Safety and Health Regula-
tions for Longshoring, § 413 is inapplicable to the longshoreman/stevedore/shipowner situa-
tion. See Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1113 (4th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Ivarans
Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854, 860 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d
1072 (4th Cir. 1978).
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rearranging cargo or having supervisory personnel on hand to assess
safety and oversee discharge.' ' 3 Similarly, section 414, which pro-
vides for liability of the employer of an independent contractor who
retains control over the work and fails to exercise that control with
reasonable care, is inapplicable to the shipowner/stevedore situa-
tion.' 34 The retention by a shipowner of the right to inspect the work
of the stevedore or stop work if it is not being performed in accord-
ance with the contract is not the pervasive control to which section
414 was intended to apply.'35 Finally, the exceptions contained in
sections 416 to 429 have been recognized to be inapplicable to cases
under the 1972 amendments since they are based on vicarious liabil-
ity.136
It is submitted that sections 343 to 343A and 410 to 429 of the
Second Restatement were never intended to apply to the ship-
owner/stevedore situations and should be disregarded by the
courts in determining the proper standard of care. It would indeed
be ironic if Congress, after instructing the courts to look to land-
based law to avoid imposition of non-delegable duties on the ship-
owner, had to act to overrule the court's misinterpretation of its
intent. It would be equally ironic if analysis of the Second
Restatement provisions, informed by the intent of Congress, left us
with only the fundamental rule of non-liability stated in section 409.
Neither result was intended by Congress. Congress intended that
the federal courts look to the substantial body of land-based law
with regard to independent contractors and extract therefrom a
federal common law as to the shipowner's duty of care to a long-
shoreman. It was a mistake of the courts to grasp immediately
Restatement provisions as a substitute for examination of the deci-
sional basis of land-based law. Based on his extensive research into
the decisions of state and federal courts applying land-based law,
Vickery has extracted the following standard of care:
The [vessel] owner . . . has a duty either
A. To use reasonable care to make the premises reasonably
safe for the use of the independent contractor, or
B. To give the independent contractor adequate and timely
Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., 542 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1976).
I See Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
861 (1977); note 36 supra.
"1 554 F.2d at 1251.
" See Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir: 1977); Hurst v.
Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); note 36
supra.
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warning of dangers known to him but unknown to the independent
contractor. " '
In addition, various corollaries of this standard of care were gleaned
from the cases. For example, there is no duty with regard to condi-
tions known or knowable to the independent contractor, '31 and
warning to the independent contractor for any dangerous conditions
on the vessel is sufficient because the stevedore, not the shipowner,
has a duty to warn its own employees. 39 The shipowner owes no duty
to warn the stevedore or its employees of dangerous conditions cre-
ated by the stevedore or its employees,'40 and the former is not liable
to a longshoreman if the injuries were caused by a condition the
stevedore was hired to correct.'41 Moreover, the shipowner who re-
tains no more right of control than is necessary to secure satisfactory
completion of the work owes no duty to protect the stevedore's em-
ployees from dangerous conditions arising during the performance
of the work. 42
It is readily apparent that Vickery's extraction of the common-
law principles leads to the same standard of care as Judge Friendly's
analysis based on effectuating Congress' objectives. Application of
this standard of care also rationalizes the results of the decisions in
the third, fourth, fifth and ninth circuits, as well as those decisions
within the second circuit that agree with the other circuit courts of
appeals. Adoption of this standard of care, however, would require
,37 Vickery, supra note 105, at 64 (in part citing Poston v. United States, 396 F.2d 103
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Wurz v. Abe Pollin, Inc., 384 F.2d 549 (4th Cir.
1967); Salim v. United States, 382 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1967); Honea v. West Va. Pulp & Paper
Co., 380 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1967); Tyler v. Peel Corp., 371 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1967); Barrett
v. Foster Grant Co., 350 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1966); Csizmadia v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 287
F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1961); Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 925 (1956)).
1" Vickery, supra note 105, at 64 (in part citing Stanley v. United States, 476 F.2d 606
(1st Cir. 1973); Honea v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 380 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1967); Hodge v.
United States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970)).
"I Vickery, supra note 105, at 65 (in part citing Kull v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 476
F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1973); Parsons v. Blount Bros., 281 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1960); Whitlow v.
Seaboard Air Line R.R., 222 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1955); Whirlpool Corp. v. Morse, 222 F. Supp.
645 (D. Minn. 1963)).
"0 Vickery, supra note 105, at 65 (in part citing Fisher v. United States, 441 F.2d 1288
(3d Cir. 1971); Olson v. Kilstofte & Vosejpka, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 583 (D. Minn. 1971); Bidetto
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 25 N.Y.2d 848, 250 N.E.2d 735, 303 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1969)).
"I Vickery, supra note 105, at 65 (in part citing Whitlow v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 222
F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1955); Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.Y.2d 104, 192 N.E.2d 163, 242
N.Y.S.2d 205 (1963); Briere v. Lathrop Co., 258 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio 1970)).
"I Vickery, supra note 105, at 65-66 (in part citing Kull v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.,
476 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1973); Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 935 (1966); Deville v. Shell Oil Corp., 366 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1966)).
[Vol. 53:1
1972 AMENDMENTS TO LHWCA
results different than those reached in Lopez and perhaps also in
Cannizzo.
CONCLUSION
In post-Sieracki days, longshoremen and other workers enjoyed
a virtual guarantee of recovery with every lawsuit commenced. In-
deed, the Supreme Court, in effect, superimposed a second compen-
sation act in which district and appellate courts reluctantly ac-
quiesced. Since the 1972 amendments, the overwhelming authority
supports a standard of care which gives effect to the express congres-
sional intent that the safety of loading and unloading operations
rests upon the stevedore. This line of cases holds that the shipowner
cannot be held liable on any theory of non-delegable duty. In addi-
tion, this body of authority rules that the shipowner may not be
exposed to liability for stevedore negligence, and that the shipowner
is not responsible for a condition within the knowledge and control
of the stevedore. These decisions point to, and are compatible with,
the standard of care enunciated by Judge Friendly in his Canizzo
dissent, and settled principles of land-based law.
A few decisions, however, apparently seek to reverse what Con-
gress had done and thwart its intent by imposing a sweeping poten-
tial liability on the shipowner based on knowledge of any dangerous
condition not actually created by the stevedore, without regard to
the shipowner's reasonable reliance on the independent contrac-
tor. This small minority of decisions represents a refusal to accept
the legislative compromise in which longshoremen and their unions
voluntarily surrendered their favored status before the courts in
exchange for unprecedented compensation benefits. In exchange for
financing these most generous benefits, the stevedore was relieved
"I Mr. Daniels, a member of the House Committee in charge of the bill on the floor,
stated in the House debate that "[tihe strongest opposition to this bill comes from a certain
group of lawyers who specialize in third party actions." 118 CONG. REc. 36,387 (1972). This
was the one interest group given short shrift by the Congress in the legislative compromise.
As the late Congressman Steiger stated:
Quite frankly, Mr. Speaker, the opposition to this bill from a small group of
attorneys is disturbing. There are some who apparently are more interested in
clogging port city courts than in effectively updating the inadequate benefits now
available.
118 CoNG. REc. 36,385 (1972).
Indeed, the longshoremen's union rejected the opposition of the plaintiff's bar to the
abolition of unseaworthiness and informed the House Committee that they opposed the bill
if the abolition of unseaworthiness were stricken therefrom. Id. It is submitted that decisions
such as Lopez grant the only vanquished interest group in this legislative compromise ulti-
mate hegemony.
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of the burden of indemnity. Decisions such as Lopez would have the
shipowner relegated to a poor third in the quid pro quo, losing al-
most certain indemnity but still facing ultimate liability for condi-
tions within the knowledge and control of the stevedore and from
which, by force of the same statute, the stevedore is required to
protect its employees.
To the extent that Congress has not preempted policy determi-
nations by the courts in this area, the same considerations, viz.,
commercial reality, safety and fairness, which underly the 1972 con-
gressional action ought to be utilized by the courts in interpreting
the legislative compromise. These considerations amply demon-
strate the soundness of the line of cases in the third, fourth, fifth
and ninth circuits and the decisions of the second circuit in
Hickman and Cox.
